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I. Introduction
In a relatively short time, Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) have 
changed their priority in interconnection negotiations from emphasizing 
global connectivity to concentrating on cost recovery and profit.  While 
still promoting ubiquitous access to the Internet “cloud”
1
 and “network of 
networks,”
2
  ISPs have become less cooperative, resulting in well-
* Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn State University.
1. The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the
Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity and the content available via these 
networks: “The increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the personal 
computer.  This shift is being led by the growth of ‘cloud computing’—the ability to run 
applications and store data on a service provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a 
person’s desktop computer.”  William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud 
Computing Privacy Under The Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010). 
2. “The Internet is a global network of networks that has been the platform for
revolutionary innovation.  The role of the Internet in enabling innovation is not accidental; rather 
it flows from the Internet’s architecture.  The key innovation-enabling feature of Internet 
   
64 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [38:1 
publicized disputes
3
 over what constitutes fair compensation for switching, 
routing, and delivering high volumes of traffic. 
At the Internet’s inception, ISPs largely embraced the twin goals of 
expanding the number of users and points of communications.
4
  These 
ventures refrained from metering traffic and charging for carriage based on 
usage because traffic volumes roughly matched, or the cost of traffic 
measurement exceeded, the estimated financial gain from better calibrated 
metering.  Most ISPs bartered network access through a process known as 
peering in lieu of metering traffic and billing for network use.
5
  ISPs also 
could downplay the importance of cost recovery from content providers 
and carriers because governments provided ample funds to incubate and 
promote the Internet. 
Eventually, governments removed subsidies on grounds that a 
commercialized Internet
6
 could sustain itself without tax payer 
architecture is comprised of layers, narrowly understood as defined by code or broadly 
understood as functional components of a communications system.”  Lawrence B. Solum & Minn 
Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 
816 (2004); see also Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization: From the Network of Networks to the 
System of Systems, 18 TELECOMM. POL’Y 286 (1994). 
3. “The hit political drama series [House of Cards] of Netflix kept about 60,000
subscribers glued onto their screens on Valentine’s Day to watch the whole 13-hour production. 
However, the shifting behavior of consumers to watch videos on demand over the Internet is 
causing some clogged pipes on the information highway.”  Randell Suba, Netflix-Verizon 
Standoff: Only Net Neutrality Can Now Stop Video Slowdown, TECH TIMES  (Feb. 23, 2014), 
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/3670/20140223/netflix-verizon-standoff-only-net-neutrality-ca 
n-now-stop-video-slowdown.htm; see also Drew Fitzgerald & Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix-
Traffic Feud Leads to Video Slowdown, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304899704579391223249896550.
4. For background on the history of Internet development, see Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G.
Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. 
Roberts & Stephen Wolff, A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml; William B. Norton, The Evolution of the U.S. 
Internet Peering Ecosystem, Draft 1.1, EQUINOX (Nov. 19, 2003), http://www.equinix.com/ 
pdf/whitepapers/PeeringEcosystem.pdf. 
5. For background on peering and other types of interconnection interconnection 
arrangements, see Dennis Weller & Bill Woodcock, Internet Traffic Exchange: Market 
Developments and Policy Challenges, OECD DIGITAL ECON. PAPERS NO. 207 (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k918gpt130q.pdf?expires=1446238564&id=id
&accname=guest&checksum=19FC2944AD026364F3BDAD20F72394D4; Ana-Maria Kovacs, 
Internet Peering and Transit, TECH. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.techpolicy 
institute.org/files/amkinternetpeeringandtransit.pdf; DR. PEERING INT’L, http://drpeering.net 
/index.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
6. “Having succeeded beyond its wildest dreams in nurturing the Internet computer web
into a vital national communications system, the Federal Government has begun turning over to 
the private sector the job of operating and maintaining the network’s major arteries.”  Peter H. 
Lewis, U.S. Begins Privatizing Internet’s Operations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 1994), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1994/10/24/business/us-begins-privatizing-internet-s-operations.html. 
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underwriting.
7
  Commercial ISPs invested substantial funds to build larger 
and faster networks to accommodate growing demand for service.
8
  The 
combination of subsidy removal and ever expanding capital expenditures to 
accommodate consumer demand prompted ISPs to use more accurate 
traffic measurement techniques to identify which carriers and customers 
generate the most traffic for carriage.
9
  ISPs have adjusted the manner in 
which they recover costs by expanding the number of service tiers available 
to subscribers by seeking new or additional compensation from upstream 
ISPs and sources of content, particularly bandwidth intensive video files,
10
 
and by metering traffic instead of offering unlimited downloading.
11
 
The matter of cost causation has become a key commercial and 
regulatory policy issue because interconnection agreements can have 
significant positive and negative impacts on competition, consumers, and 
the Internet ecosystem.  In a best-case scenario, traffic metering fosters 
greater efficiency in both the provisioning and use of Internet resources.
12
 
In a worst-case scenario, an ISP could use its market power to extort above 
cost compensation from content sources and distributors, as well as retail 
broadband subscribers.  Rather than offer desirable quality of service 
enhancement, an ISP might generate artificial congestion as a way to 
demand higher compensation and otherwise disadvantage a competitor to 
the ISP or its affiliate. 
Consumers suffer when interconnection carriers cannot reach fair terms 
on a timely basis.  Regardless of whether traffic congestion results from 
artificial manipulation or a substantial increase in volume, broadband 
service subscribers quickly become inconvenienced and angry when 
7. “NSF awarded contracts in 1995 for three network access points, to provide connection 
points between commercial networks, and one routing arbiter, to ensure an orderly exchange of 
traffic across the Internet.  In addition, NSF signed a cooperative agreement to establish the next-
generation very-high-performance Backbone Network Service.  A more prominent milestone was 
the decommissioning of the NSFNET backbone in April 1995.”  Fact Sheet: A Brief History of 
NSF and the Internet, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2003), http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_ 
summ.jsp?cntn_id=103050.  “In the years following NSFNET, NSF helped navigate the road to a 
self-governing and commercially viable Internet during a period of remarkable growth.” Id.  
8. See Shane Greenstein, Commercialization of the Internet: The Interaction of Public
Policy and Private Choices or Why Introducing the Market Worked So Well, in 1 INNOVATION 
POL’Y AND THE ECON. 151 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001), 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10779.pdf. 
9. See INTERNET ECONOMICS, (Lew W. McKnight & Joseph P. Bailey eds., 2000).
10. See Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that Challenge the
Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 95–96 (2010). 
11. Brian Stelterjune, Sweeping Effects as Broadband Moves to Meters. N.Y. TIMES (June
26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/business/media/internet-providers-testing-metere 
d-plans-for-broadband.html?_r=0.
12. See Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy’s Next Frontier: Usage-Based Broadband Pricing, 
66 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (2013). 
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streams of “must see” video disconnect, or degrade.  Consumers expect all 
participating carriers to resolve interconnection disputes before “mission 
critical” traffic fails to arrive in the proper sequence and speed.
13
 
The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and National 
Regulatory Agencies (“NRAs”) in other nations have responded with ex 
ante, regulatory safeguards
14
 designed to anticipate and prevent 
anticompetitive and consumer harming practices.  Regulatory oversight 
concentrates on ISPs providing “last mile” broadband services to 
consumers
15
 because of limited facilities-based competition and the fact 
that nearly all end users rely on only one ISP to handle all traffic deliveries.  
Advocates for ex ante regulatory oversight conclude that last mile ISPs 
have both the incentive and ability to manipulate the interconnection 
process in ways that can handicap upstream carriers and content courses 
unless they agree to unfair compensation terms and conditions.  Worst-case 
scenarios anticipate Internet fast lanes available to ventures with sufficient 
financial resources to pay surcharges for prioritization of their traffic, 
relegating others to unreliable, slow lanes.
16
  Under such a dichotomy, the 
Internet ecosystem would suffer as market entrants might not have the 
opportunity to achieve a fair trial with consumers because of their inability 
to pay for enhanced service that has become mandatory.  While, 
previously, market entrants could rely on conventional, “best efforts” 
13. See, e.g., Joseph W. Waz, Jr., Comcast’s Letter to FCC on Level 3, COMCAST:
COMCAST VOICES (Nov. 30, 2010), http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/comcasts-letter-
to-fcc-on-level-3; see also Joseph W. Waz, Jr., 20 Q’s—with Accurate A’s—About Level 3’s 
Peering Dispute, COMCAST: COMCAST VOICES (Dec. 7, 2010), http://blog.comcast.com 
/2010/12/20-qs—-with-accurate-as—-about-level-3s-peering-dispute.html; see also Press 
Release: Level 3 Releases Statement to Clarify Issues in Comcast/Level3 Interconnection Dispute, 
THE STREET (Dec. 3, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10937967/1/level-3-releas 
es-statement-to-clarify-issues-in-comcastlevel-3-interconnection-dispute.html. 
14. See Rob Frieden, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Network Neutrality: A 
Comparative Assessment, BERKELEY TECH L. J. (forthcoming). 
15. “Broadband Internet access service involves the exchange of traffic between a last-mile 
broadband provider and connecting networks.  The representation to retail customers that they 
will be able to reach ‘all or substantially all Internet endpoints’ necessarily includes the promise 
to make the interconnection arrangements necessary to allow that access.”  Protecting and 
Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, FCC 15-24, 2015 WL 1120110, ¶ 204 (rel. 
Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order].  
16. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 
13,028 (2008), vacated; Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (deeming FCC to 
have exceeded its statutory authority when responding to a complaint and imposing network 
neutrality rules); Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC 
Docket No. 07-52, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order], aff’d in 
part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 15; Order Denying Stay Petitions, DA 15-563, 2015 WL 
2195245 (rel. May 8, 2015). 
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traffic routing, ISPs might so degrade this service with an eye toward 
nudging or forcing upstream carriers and content providers to pay 
surcharges for now essential, “better than best efforts” traffic delivery.
17
 
A number of highly publicized traffic interconnection and 
compensation disputes have recently occurred among ISPs and between 
them and content distributors.
18
  The most controversial clashes have 
involved Netflix and ventures handling its extremely large volume of 
downstream video traffic, as well as last mile ISPs, such as Comcast and 




These disputes evidence a substantial change in strategies and tactics 
among ventures operating within the Internet ecosystem.  In particular, the 
process for negotiating network interconnection appears increasingly 
contentious instead of cooperative, as carriers attempt to extract higher 
compensation, particularly when the volume of downstream traffic vastly 
exceeds what a last mile ISP generates for upstream delivery.  Last mile 
ISPs appear most able and inclined to exploit possible market power as 
terminating monopolies, particularly when negotiating with content sources 
17. For background on ISPs’ strategies to provide service enhancements for additional
compensation, see Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality and Consumer Demand for “Better Than 
Best Efforts” Traffic Management, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming); 
Rob Frieden, Internet Protocol Television and the Challenge of “Mission Critical” Bits, 33 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J., 1, 47–87 (2015). 
18. “If you are trying to get Netflix and use Verizon’s broadband, then there is a good
chance that your video performance is less than optimal.  Some Verizon customers might even go 
as far as calling it a crappy Netflix experience.  The reason: a behind-the-scenes power play 
between Verizon and Cogent Communications, one of the largest bandwidth providers.”  Om 
Malik & Stacey Higginbotham, Having Problems with Your Netflix? You Can Blame Verizon, 
GIGAOM (June 17, 2013), https://gigaom.com/2013/06/17/having-problems-with-your-netflix-
you-can-blame-verizon/; see also Dan Rayburn, Inside the Netflix/Comcast Deal and What the 
Media Is Getting Very Wrong, STREAMING MEDIA BLOG (Feb. 23, 2014), http://blog.str 
eamingmedia.com/2014/02/media-botching-coverage-netflix-comcast-deal-getting-basics-
wrong.html. 
19. “From what information is public, it appears that the largest ISPs are demanding
payment from networks that deliver content and services that residential broadband consumers 
demand.  Because the large residential ISPs themselves are the ones keeping the terms of their 
deals secret, it is raises the question of whether they have something to hide.”  Brats Cox Jr., 
Press Release: Public Knowledge Raises Concerns over Netflix/Comcast Agreement, PUB. 
KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.publicknowledge.org/press-release/public-knowledge-
raises-concerns-over-netflixcomca.  “Alexis Ohanian, startup investor and co-founder of Reddit, 
lashed out at U.S. broadband policy on Thursday, calling on the FCC to reclassify internet 
broadband as ‘the utility we all know it to be.’  Ohanian aimed special vitriol at Comcast, 
affecting a mafia-style voice to accuse the cable giant of ‘legal extortion’ for fiddling with Netflix 
speeds until the video site paid it to restore proper service.” Jeff John Roberts, Comcast 
“Extortion” Shows the Need to Treat Broadband As a Utility, Reddit’s Ohanian Said, GIGAOM 
(Oct. 16, 2014), https://gigaom.com/2014/10/16/comcast-extortion-shows-the-need-to-treat-
broadband-as-a-utility-reddits-ohanian-said/. 
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and Content Distribution Networks (“CDNs”)
20
 that provide downstream 
video delivery from content sources to last mile ISPs. 
Most broadband subscribers in the United States have limited facilities-
based carrier options,
21
 particularly for the high transmission speeds needed 
for delivery of full motion video content.
22
  Consumers typically subscribe 
to only one ISP, and they may not readily change carriers even if options 
20. “In recent years, more complex arrangements have developed, as companies constantly 
seek to optimize performance along both financial and engineering dimensions.  Some networks 
now pay for peering in order to guarantee performance on the terminating network.  The rise of 
content delivery networks, which store content close to its destination using caching servers for 
improved performance, has also changed Internet interconnection dynamics.  The environment is 
considerably more complex today than in the days of ‘Tier 1’ peering.” Kevin Werbach, No 
Dialtone: The End of the Public Switched Telephone Network, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 203, 240 
(2014).  Content providers and distributors can opt to negotiate directly with retail ISPs for the 
right to install (“co-locate”) equipment on site, or, alternatively, secure the services of a company 
such as Akamai to negotiate, install and maintain the equipment.  Netflix has sought the direct 
negotiation option with ISPs.  See Ken Florence, Announcing the Netflix Open Connect Network, 
NETFLIX: U.S. & CAN. BLOG (June 4, 2012), http://blog.netflix.com/2012/06/announcing-netflix-
open-connect-network.html. 
21. “At the low end of throughput, 4 Mbps and 10 Mbps, the majority of Americans have a
choice of only two providers.  That is what economists call a ‘duopoly’, a marketplace that is 
typically characterized by less than vibrant competition.  But even two ‘competitors’ overstates 
the case.  Counting the number of choices the consumer has on the day before their Internet 
service is installed does not measure their competitive alternatives the day after.  Once consumers 
choose a broadband provider, they face high switching costs that include early-termination fees, 
and equipment rental fees.  And, if those disincentives to competition weren’t enough, the media 
is full of stories of consumers’ struggles to get ISPs to allow them to drop service.”  Tom 
Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, Prepared Remarks: The Facts and Future of Broadband Competition, 
(Sept. 4, 2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329161A1.pdf; see also 
National Broadband Map: How Connected Is My Community?, NAT’L BROAD. MAP, 
http://www.broadbandmap.gov/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
22. “We conclude that advanced telecommunications capability is not being deployed to all
Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.  We reach this conclusion for several distinct and 
independent reasons.  First, we find that a significant number of Americans—approximately 55 
million, 17 percent—lack access to service capable of originating and receiving at, respectively, 
25 Mbps download and 3 Mbps upload speeds or higher—the speed we have determined best 
satisfies the statutory definition of advanced telecommunications capability.  Not only do a 
significant number and percentage of Americans lack access to advanced telecommunications 
capability, but the deployment rate is not reasonable and timely.  The overall percentage of 
Americans without access to 25 Mbps/3 Mbps dropped only three percentage points between 
2012 and 2013, and the percentage of Americans in rural areas without such access dropped by a 
mere two percentage points over the same span of time.  Moreover, more than half of Americans 
living in rural areas cannot subscribe to advanced telecommunications capability.”  Inquiry 
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a 
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to 
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data 
Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 14-126, 2015 Broadband Progress Report and Notice of 
Inquiry on Immediate Action to Accelerate Deployment, FCC 15-10, ¶ 133 (rel. Feb. 5, 2015), 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-finds-us-broadband-deployment-not-keeping-pace-0 [hereinafter 
FCC 2-15 Broadband Report]. 
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exist.
23
  Additionally, end users require higher transmission speeds and 
downloading capacity in light of growing demand for bandwidth intensive 




Under current marketplace conditions, last mile ISPs have raised rates 
and segmented service into different tiers of transmission speed and 
monthly allocation of permitted downloading capacity.
25
  Additionally, 
they have imposed surcharges on upstream CDNs and other carriers.
26
 
Exploiting superior bargaining leverage has translated into a number of 
new interconnection and compensation arrangements that deviate from 
both traditional telecommunications and Internet carriage models.
27
 
This article will examine new models for the carriage of Internet traffic 
with an eye toward providing insights on how the interconnection process 
has changed and what positive and negative consequences have resulted.  
The article will explain how some types of price and quality of service 
discrimination benefits and harms consumers.  It also identifies instances 
where migration from traditional interconnection arrangements can reduce 
23. “As described by numerous commenters, and detailed more thoroughly in a
Commission report compiling the results of an extensive consumer survey, the costs of switching 
include: ‘early termination fees; the inconvenience of ordering, installation, and set-up, and 
associated deposits or fees; possible difficulty returning the earlier broadband provider’s 
equipment and the cost of replacing incompatible customer-owned equipment; the risk of 
temporarily losing service; the risk of problems learning how to use the new service; and the 
possible loss of a provider-specific email address or website.’”  Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 
647 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing 2010 Open Internet Order, at 17924–25 ¶ 34 and FCC, Broadband 
Decisions: What Drives Consumers to Switch—Or Stick With—Their Broadband Internet 
Provider (FCC Working Paper (Dec. 2010), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
303264A1.pdf/.  “The Commission also convincingly detailed how broadband providers’ position 
in the market gives them the economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the 
services they furnish edge providers.  Because all end users generally access the Internet through 
a single broadband provider, that provider functions as a ‘terminating monopolist,’ with power to 
act as a ‘gatekeeper’ with respect to edge providers that might seek to reach its end-user 
subscribers.”  Verizon, 740 F.3d at 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Preserving the Open Internet, GN 
Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905, 17919 
(2010)). 
24. “The average household includes 2.58 people, and the average family household
includes as many as 4.3 people.  Household members may use one or more broadband services, 
from multiple devices, simultaneously; and there is some evidence that the average household has 
seven Internet-connected devices.  The sheer number and wide array of broadband-capable 
devices in American households suggest that they are often used simultaneously.”  Inquiring 
Concerning the Development of Advanced Telecommunications, GN Docket No. 14-126, Report 
and Notice of Inquiry, FCC 15-10, ¶ 38 (rel. Feb. 4, 2015). 
25. See, e.g., Press Release, Comcast, Comcast to Launch Extreme 50 Mbps High-Speed
Internet Service in San Francisco and on the Peninsula (Apr. 21, 2015), http://comcastcalifornia. 
mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=279. 
26. See, e.g., Fitzgerald & Ramachandran,supra note 3.
27. See Yoo, supra note 9, at 95–99 (outlining new ISP interconnection variations of
peering and transiting). 
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some of the benefits accruing from positive network effects and 
externalities.
28
  This article concludes that NRAs should permit ISPs to 
negotiate new commercial arrangements, such as paid peering, so long as 
the parties can demonstrate that both content providers and end users do 
not incur the absolute necessity to pay higher prices to secure adequate, 
uncongested service. 
II. Five Generations of Internet Development
In quick succession, the Internet has evolved from a non-commercial 
subsidized medium to a commercial ecosystem where ISPs have to 
generate revenues sufficient to recoup ever-increasing infrastructure costs 
to accommodate growing supply and demand for bandwidth.  ISPs 
previously could avoid having to meter traffic and identify supply-push and 
demand-pull growth in capacity requirements as governments directly 
underwrote investment in new facilities for switching, routing, and 
transmitting traffic.  Now, ISPs have no source of subsidies and thereby 
have to recoup substantial infrastructure investments from content creators 
and distributors, as well as consumers. 
Much of the growth in the supply of bandwidth intensive content 
comes from Over the Top (“OTT”)
29
 applications, particularly ones that 
offer video content or provide a cheaper alternative to incumbent services, 
such as voice telephony and text messaging.  OTT applications, such as 
Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”),
30
 Voice over the Internet Protocol 
28. “Because the attractiveness of the platform grows with the number of users, it is
possible for network effects to cause a market to ‘tip’ to monopoly.  Such externalities are less 
likely to occur in other kinds of platforms, such as those for Internet search or on-line shopping, 
but these services may nonetheless benefit from less direct forms of network effects.  A shopping 
network with a comparatively large number of users might be more appealing because of the 
greater number of available product and service reviews.  Likewise, a more widely used search 
engine might provide greater confidence to a user because the results she is seeing are what many 
others are seeing and relying upon.”  Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and 
Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 PENN L. REV. 1663, 1682 (2013). 
29. “Over-the-top VoIP [and other] services require the end user to obtain broadband 
transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-top [services] can vary in 
terms of the extent to which they rely on their own facilities.”  Preserving the Open Internet, 25 
F.C.C.R. 17,905, 17,916 n.48 (2010), aff’d in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. 
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014), on remand, Protecting and Promoting the Open
Internet, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,448 (July 1, 2014).  In the United States, OTT operators do not need to
secure the consent of ISPs for carriage of their content.  However, ISPs pay close attention to the
volume of traffic generated by OTT operators, particularly ventures offering bandwidth intensive
video content such as Netflix.  ISPs have demanded additional compensation for their efforts to 
ensure congestion-free carriage of Netflix content. See Fitzgerald & Ramachandran. supra note 3.
ISP involvement with OTT ventures primarily occurs in the negotiation and execution of
agreements to promote congestion-free delivery of video content.  Id.
30. IPTV offers consumers with broadband connection options to download video files or
view (streaming) video content on an immediate “real time” basis.  See Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25 
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(“VoIP”),
31
 video teleconferencing, and Internet-based texting ride “on top” 
of an already functioning broadband link.  OTT content and services 
represent an increasingly significant portion of all broadband traffic 
32
 and 
arguably have the greatest impact on many consumers’ decision to 
subscribe to a broadband service and what tier of transmission speed and 
monthly capacity allotment to purchase.
33
 
Set out below is a brief summary of the four generations of Internet 
development that precede the current one driven by growth in OTT video 
supply and demand: 
1) Incubation—government administration, first through the United
States Defense Department and later through the United States National 
Science Foundation and universities and research institutes throughout the 
world (1980s-1995); 
F.C.C.R. 3879, 3879 (2010).  Some of the available content duplicates what cable television
subscribers receive, therein triggering disputes over whether cable operators can secure exclusive
distribution agreements and prevent an IPTV service provider from distributing the same content.
“Sky Angel has been providing its subscribers with certain Discovery networks for approximately
two and a half years, including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel,
Planet Green, and the Military Channel.  Sky Angel submits that these channels are a significant
part of its service offering.”  Id. at 3879–80 (footnote omitted).  For background on IPTV, see
generally In-Sung Yoo, Comment, The Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television:
How the Federal Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation
and Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009).
31. “The Internet developed initially as an academic curiosity, based on a commitment to
the ‘end-to-end principle.’  This principle requires that all Internet traffic, whether an email, a 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) ‘call’ or a video stream, be treated equally and managed 
through ‘best efforts’ connections.  In such a network, data packets pass from one router to 
another without the prioritization of any particular packets.  In practice, this means that Internet 
traffic reaches its destination at varying times, depending on the traffic levels of the relevant 
Internet communications links.”  Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 277–78 (2008). 
32. Netflix currently generates as much as thirty-four percent of the total traffic ISPs handle
at peak hours in the United States.  Drew Fitzgerald, Netflix Share of Internet Traffic Grows, 
WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB2000142405270230490830 
4579561802483718502; Sandvine Report: Netflix Dominates (Still), Amazon Instant Video 
Growing, SANDVINE (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.sandvine.com/pr/2014/11/20/sandvine-report-
netflix-dominates-still-amazon-instant-video-growing.html.   
33. See Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology, 2014–2019 White
Paper, CISCO (May 27, 2015), http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-
provider/ip-ngn-ip-next-generation-network/white_paper_c11-481360.html; The Zettabyte Era—
Trends and Analysis, CISCO (May 2015), http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/ 
service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/VNI_Hyperconnectivity_WP.html; Akamai’s State 
of the Internet: Q1 2015 Report, STATE OF THE INTERNET (June 24, 2015), http://www.stateofth 
einternet.com/resources-connectivity-2015-q1-state-of-the-internet-report.html; Mary Meeker, 
Internet Trends 2015–Code Conference, KPCB (May 27, 2015), http://www.kpcb.com/internet-
trends. 
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2) Privatization—governments eliminate financial subsidies obligating
contractors to assess whether and how to operate commercially (1995-
1998); 
3) Commercialization—private networks proliferate as do ventures
creating software applications and content that traverse the Internet.  The 
“dotcom boom” triggers irrational, excessive investment and overcapacity 
(1998-2001); and 
4) Diversification—after the dotcom bust and market re-entrenchment,
Internet survivors and market entrants expand the array of available 
services and ISPs offer diversified terms, conditions and rates, including 
price and quality of service discrimination needed by “mission critical” 
traffic having high bandwidth requirements, e.g., full motion video content. 
A. Generation 1: Incubation
Until 1995, the United States government, through the Defense
Department and later the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), 
underwrote development and maintenance of the core Internet backbone, 
NSFnet.
34
  National governments in other parts of the world pursued 
similar network projects.  The Internet began as specialized, closed 
networks between specific operators and users.  Governments incubated 
what became the Internet through financial subsidies and by being the first 
major “anchor tenant” of newly created networks. 
Government stewardship helped expedite the research and 
development of the technologies and the uniform operating standards 
needed to achieve broadly accessible and interconnected networking.  The 
engineering necessary to support self-healing, redundant, and reliable 
networks for the military and other government users also supported 
seamless connectivity among the many different networks operating 
throughout the world using different vintages of equipment manufactured 
by many different companies. 
After incubating the Internet as a medium for traffic associated with 
research and education, NSF determined that it could conclude its public 
financing and a commercial, privatized Internet could evolve.  NSF’s 1993 
public solicitation document
35
 anticipated a privatized Internet with a 
structure much like what we have today: a hierarchy of many small ISPs 
34. For background on how the National Science Foundation incubated and financially 
supported initial development of the Internet see NSF and the Birth of the Internet, NAT’L SCI. 
FOUND., http://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/nsf-net/. 
35. Solicitation for Network Access Point Manager, Routing Arbiter, Regional Network
Providers, and Very High Speed Backbone Network Services Provider for NSFNET and NREN 
Program, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (May 6, 1993), https://w2.eff.org/Infrastructure/Govt_docs/ 
nsf_nren.rfp.  
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serving localities and regions, fewer inter-regional Tier-2 ISPs, and even 
fewer Tier-1 ISPs serving entire nations with the highest capacity backbone 
networks. 
At the outset of Internet development, government contractors 
engineered national networks accessible primarily by government, 
academic, and research users.  With few operators, generally having the 
same characteristics in terms of user population, bandwidth, traffic 
switching capabilities, network management staffing, and geographical 
reach, the parties could agree to simple interconnection and access 
arrangements.  The intelligence behind Internet network routing sought to 
achieve efficiency and the ability to route around outages and congestion.  
Because all the ISPs in this phase had roughly the same characteristics and 
traffic volumes, their routing assignments generated approximately the 
same financial burdens. 
Internet access in this first phase sought primarily to achieve better 
geographical reach and more users with little regard to the cost of access, 
as well as who caused an ISP to incur such costs.  This promotional phase 
emphasized the accrual of positive networking externalities
36
 so much so 
that the parties did not seek to monitor traffic flows.  Because few ISPs 
existed, each having the same characteristics and operating with 
government funding, the parties saw little benefit and significant cost in 
negotiating interconnection agreements that required carriers to meter 
traffic. 
In this first promotional phase all participating ISPs agreed to network 
“peering,” meaning that they would provide reciprocal access to each 
other’s subscribers in a free exchange of traffic that would take place at a 
few shared, “public” Network Access Points (“NAPs”).
37
  The few ISPs 
36. A positive network externality exists when the cost incurred by a user of the Internet
does not fully reflect the benefit derived with the addition of new users and points of 
communications.  See John Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and 
Innovation, 16 RAND J. OF ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Network 
Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); see also Mark A. 
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 
479 (1998).  
37. For helpful background on how peering developed, see Scott Marcus, Global Traffic
Exchange Among Internet Service Providers, OECD (2001), http://www.oecd.org 
/internet/broadband/1894955.pdf; Geoff Huston, Interconnection Peering and Settlements, 
INET’99 Presentation, http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/1e/1e_1.htm; William B. Norton, 
Interconnection Strategies for ISPs (v.2.1), DR. PEERING, http://drpeering.net/white-
papers/_pdfs/Interconnection-Strategies-for-ISPs.pdf (last vistied Oct. 16, 2015); Bill Woodcock, 
White Paper on Transactions and Valuation Associated with Inter-Carrier Routing of Internet 
Protocol Traffic—or—BGP for Bankers, (v. 0.2), http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/bgp-for-
bankers/BGP-for-Bankers-v02.doc; Daniel C.H. Mah, Explaining Internet Connectivity: 
Voluntary Interconnection Among Commercial Internet Service Providers (Mar. 26, 2003), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2053810; Steve Gibbard, Economics of 
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operating at this time agreed to receive traffic from the other ISPs for 
onward delivery to the final intended destination, or to another ISP in 
exchange for the same traffic acceptance and delivery commitment from 
the other ISPs.  This barter interconnection commitment triggered no 
exchange of funds based on the “rough justice” expectation that an ISP 
would deliver roughly the same amount of traffic generated by other ISPs 
that it handed off for delivery by those ISPs.
38
  In the vernacular of 
telecommunications carriers, this arrangement constituted a “bill and keep” 
and “sender keep all” arrangement
39
 because each ISP retained all revenues 
it generated from subscriptions for traffic carriage regardless of whether it 
solely provided the transmission or whether it handed off the traffic for 
carriage by other ISPs. 
B. Generation 2: Privatization
NSF’s glide path to privatization largely succeeded with former
contractors migrating to positions of owning and operating backbone 
networks and NAPs.
40
  MCI, whose assets Verizon now holds, won the 
solicitation to take over the very high speed backbone network that 
Peering (Oct. 2004), http://paranoidbits.com/ebooks/economics/Gibbard-peering-economics.pdf. 
For more recent tutorials on the peering process, see William B Norton, Peering Tutorial, 2012 
Peering Forum, APRICOT (Jan, 28, 2012), http://www.apricot.net/ apricot2012/__data/assets/ 
pdf_file/0010/45586/peering-tutorial.pdf; Richard A Steenbergen, A Guide to Peering on the 
Internet, N. AM. NETWORK OPERATORS GRP. (Jan. 30, 2011), https://www. 
nanog.org/meetings/nanog51/presentations/Sunday/NANOG51.Talk3.peeringnanog51.pdf. 
38. “Most . . . peering relationships have been historically ‘settlement free’ because they
benefit both parties and because traffic demands were symmetrical.”  Dirk Grunwald, The 
Internet Ecosystem: The Potential for Discrimination, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 411, 427 (2011).  
39. “In a bill-and-keep or sender-keeps-all arrangement, each carrier bills its own customers
for the origination of traffic and does not pay the other carrier for terminating this traffic.  In a 
settlement arrangement, on the other hand, the carrier on which the traffic originates pays the 
other carrier to terminate the traffic.  If traffic flow between the two networks is balanced, the net 
settlement that each pays is zero, and therefore a bill-and-keep arrangement may be preferred 
because the networks do not have to incur costs to measure and track traffic or to develop billing 
systems.  As an example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 allows for incumbent local 
exchange carriers to exchange traffic with competitors using a bill-and-keep arrangement.” 
Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 COMM L. 
CONSPECTUS 45, 51 n.60 (2003) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 252 (d)(2)(B)(i) (2000)).  “The sharing of 
traffic over the interconnected networks forming the Internet on a statistical and un-metered 
‘settlements’ (or ‘bill & keep’) basis was a hallmark of early federal agency involvement in the 
development of the Internet.  This system of traffic carriage free of charge became known as 
‘peering.’” Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future tn Terms of the Past (F.C.C., 
O.P.P. Working Paper No. 30, 1998), 1998 WL 567433. 
40. See Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, The Privatization of the Internet’s Backbone
Network, 51 J. OF BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 93 (Dec. 2007), http://governingwithcode. 
org/journal_articles/pdf/Backbone.pdf; see also Press Release, Nat’l Sci. Found., Internet Moves 
Toward Privatization, 97-046 (June 24, 1997), http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ. 
jsp?cntn_id=102819. 
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previously had served NSF-sponsored research institutions including 
Cornell University, supercomputer centers in Pittsburgh and San Diego, 
and several government facilities.  MCI upgraded its Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode network from OC-3 (155 megabits per second) to OC-12 
(622 megabits per second).  NSF subsequently sought proposals for the 
creation of private NAPs in Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, San Diego, 
San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. 
With the privatization of the Internet, a hierarchical industrial structure 
developed.  At the top of the pyramid stood a handful of Tier-1 ISPs whose 
network size, customer base, and operational success qualified them for the 
direct and cost-free exchange of traffic.  While peering used to predominate 
as the primary mode of the NSF network interconnection, the 
commercialization of the Internet created opportunities for market entry by 
more ISPs and new incentives for all ISPs to charge what the market would 
bear for network access.  The composition of ISPs expanded and 
diversified in terms of available bandwidth, geographical reach, 
subscribership, types of available content, etc. 
In light of this diversification and proliferation of ISPs, universal 
peering became unsustainable.  ISPs, not having sufficient size and 
importance, became customers of network access provided by the Tier-1 
and other ISPs.  This meant that smaller ISPs had to pay the larger Tier-1 
ISPs for the privilege of accessing the Tier-1 ISP’s customers and network 
connections.  The term transit—also borrowed from the 
telecommunications vernacular—refers to a negotiated business 
relationship whereby one ISP sells access to its customers, its network, and 
its access to other ISP networks it has negotiated. 
Clearly no ISP beneficiary of cost-free peering appreciated the 
demoted status of having to pay for access as a customer and reseller.  Yet 
this demotion appeared to occur on the basis of sound business judgment 
made by individual Tier-1 ISPs and not on the basis of collusion or 
concerted refusals to deal.  ISPs in Asia-Pacific and Africa bore the greatest 
financial burden in having to self-provision lines to and from NAPs in 
North America and Europe, as well as the obligation to pay for transit.  But 
smaller ISPs everywhere incurred a similar, albeit less expensive, burden as 
well.  ISPs in North America generated less telecommunications expense in 
reaching a Tier-1 ISPs NAP, or Point of Presence, in light of the 
proliferation of such facilities and their close proximity to most Tier-1 
ISPs.  ISPs located in more remote areas had to procure at their expense the 
complete link to Tier-1 ISP facilities, even though once installed these two-
way links provided Tier-1 ISPs with a cost-free pathway to the smaller 
remotely located ISP and its subscribers. 
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ISPs in remotely located regions objected to having to provide typically 
well financed Tier-1 ISPs a “free ride” for the delivery of traffic from the 
Tier-1 ISPs.  Certainly from a telecommunications service orientation, it 
appeared that the remotely located ISP underwrote the full cost of “return” 
traffic in light of the bi-directional nature of telecommunications links 
instead of having to pay half of such cost.  However, in the context of 
Internet service, the free ride attribution breaks down.  First, the Internet 
seamlessly combines telecommunications bit transport conduit function 
with access to content.  Particularly at the time of Phase Two in the 
Internet’s development, ISP subscribers could access most of the content 
available via the Internet for nothing more than the cost of their ISP 
subscription.  Put another way, when an ISP pays another larger ISP for 
transit services, the smaller ISP acquires access to the larger ISP’s 
subscribers and the content available from these customers, as well as the 
customers of other ISPs with which the larger ISP peers or pays for transit.  
Smaller ISPs had to pay for access to and from larger ISPs in North 
America and Europe, but the smaller ISPs could then acquire and deliver 
content that their subscribers sought.  Much of the most desired content 
resided on servers located in North America and Europe, meaning that 
remote ISPs had to secure access to be able to deliver the content their 
subscribers expected to access. 
Internet transit access arrangements also do not match the limited 
geographical scope of a telecommunications transit arrangements.  In 
telecommunications service, transit arrangements typically secure an 
indirect link for a carrier in one location, primarily because this carrier 
might not have sufficient traffic volume to secure a direct link.  In Internet 
service, transit arrangements typically provide access to a vast array of 
networks certainly not limited to one country or carrier.  In its most 
expansive role, one Internet transit payment arrangement with one major 
Tier-1 ISP can provide a small, remote ISP with access to the rest of the 
world because the Tier-1 ISP has secured ubiquitous access and, therefore, 
can offer (advertise in the Internet vernacular) an extensive list of routing 
opportunities. 
C. Generation 3: Commercialization
The “irrational exuberance” of the dotcom bubble stimulated a gold
rush mentality among investors keen on finding “ground floor” stock 
ownership opportunities.
41
  Undocumented and belatedly refuted claims 
41. “The Dot-com Bubble or the Tech Bubble was a speculative bubble in the shares of
early internet companies called ‘Dot-coms.’” Jesse Colombo, The Dot-com Bubble, THE BUBBLE 
BUBBLE (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.thebubblebubble.com/dot-com-bubble/; see also Dan 
Steinbock, Twin Drivers and Irrational Exuberance: Markets, the Internet and Mobility, 5 INT’L 
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that the Internet doubled in size on a monthly basis encouraged risk taking 
based on the assumption that a rising tide would raise all ships, i.e., that 
anyone investing at the onset of the Information Revolution would reap 
ample returns.  Investors sank several hundred billion dollars in incumbent 
and new telecommunications and ISP networks.  The resulting glut in local 
and long haul transmission capacity had the impact of creating substantial 
downward pressure on Internet transport cost and precluding any pricing 
discipline by Tier-1 ISPs individually, or even collectively, had they 
attempted to collude.  Similarly, even before the dotcom implosion, several 
Tier-1 ISPs experienced financial distress, but the infusion of more 
investment helped create new aspiring Tier-1 and Tier-2 operators. 
D. Generation 4:  Diversification
The popping of the dotcom bubble triggered substantial losses in the
Internet marketplace and a relatively short period of irrational pessimism.
42
 
The post-dotcom bubble environment appears to emphasize a shorter 
transition to profitability, but substantial funds continue to be invested in 
business plans requiring the use of Internet connections.  With less 
tolerance for financial losses, investors expect to see a realistic timetable 
for profitability.  Throughout the Internet ecosystem, ventures have a 
greater appreciation for cost control and the need to turn cash flow positive 
quickly. 
ICE ventures in this fourth phase have to pay close attention to costs.  
This means that the carriers providing traffic delivery services will closely 
monitor traffic flows and have little patience for instances where a traffic 
partner has executed a peering agreement, but either generates 
comparatively more downstream traffic or lacks the network capacity 
upstream to route traffic it receives from a peer.  While relatively few in 
number, perhaps because ISPs generally use Non-Disclosure Agreements 
to shroud peering terms and disputes,
43
 the onset of peering disputes create 
J. ON MEDIA MGMT. 109 (2009), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1424127030
9390025?journalCode=hijm20.
42. “But in March of 2000, 15 years ago, one of those things came to a crashing halt.  The 
dotcom bubble, which had been building up for the better part of three years, slowly began to 
pop.  Stocks sunk.  Companies folded.  Fortunes were lost, and the American economy started to 
slip down a slow mudslide that would end up in full-on recession.”  Ben Geier, What Did We 
Learn from the Dotcom Stock Bubble of 2000?, TIME (Mar. 12, 2015), http://time.com/ 
3741681/2000-dotcom-stock-bust/. 
43. The “norms [for a blend of FCC and industry self-regulation of the Internet] might
include requirements to provide some level of transparency over the terms of treating a 
counterpart as a peer deserving of settlement-free interconnection as opposed to a customer 
required to pay for transit.”  Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 529, 576 (2009); see also Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need
for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105 (2010).
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incentives for a partner to quickly force a renegotiation of terms, possibly 




Greater vigilance of traffic volumes and the proliferation of Internet-
mediated services have also created incentives for ISPs to diversify the 
nature, type, terms, and conditions for network interconnection beyond the 
peering/transiting dichotomy.  While NDAs obscure which ISP has agreed 
to what terms for new traffic routing and interconnection arrangements, the 
diversification of services carried via the Internet has prompted ISPs to 
expand the types of interconnection arrangements.  For example, the 
growing market for access to full motion video content delivered on an 
instantaneous, “real time basis” has stimulated the creation of a new type of 
service provider called Content Delivery Network (“CDN”) that offers 
guaranteed “better than best efforts” routing of traffic.
45
  Because many 
CDNs concentrate on the downstream delivery of traffic, they may have the 
volume that would stimulate interest in a peering arrangement, but not 
necessarily the network capability to handle a commensurate upstream 
flow. 
Ongoing need to upgrade infrastructure to handle increasingly 
bandwidth intensive applications creates a powerful financial incentive for 
ISPs to change the terms and conditions for service both upstream and 
downstream.  Many ISPs initially offered retail subscribers an “all you can 
eat” unmetered service plan based on the correct perception that all but 
early adopters would need financial inducements to “test drive” the 
Internet.  Now that the Internet marketplace has evolved, many ISPs see 
unmetered service as conferring an unnecessary windfall on high volume 
users to the detriment of the carrier and low volume users.  ISPs perceive 
Network Neutrality
46
 initiatives as foreclosing necessary pricing flexibility. 
44. For example, in 2008, Sprint and Cogent “de-peered” their networks, causing temporary
service disruptions between their customers. See Om Malik, Cogent, Sprint Disconnect 
Networks, May Cause Web Slowdown, GIGAOM (Oct. 30, 2008), 
http://gigaom.com/2008/10/30/cogent-sprint-un-peer-may-cause-web-slowdown. 
45. “Today, much Web content is not delivered to the ultimate recipient directly from the
Web server belonging to the original creator, but via a content delivery network (CDN)—a 
collection of servers that cache the content and deliver it on demand.”  David D. Clark & Marjory 
S. Blumenthal, The End-to-End Argument and Application Design: The Role of Trust, 63 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 357, 364–65 (2011).
46. Network neutrality refers to regulatory initiatives requiring Internet Service Providers to
operate as neutral, nondiscriminating conduits prohibited from prioritizing, blocking and slowing 
traffic absent compelling network management justifications.  See Justin S. Brown & Andrew W. 
Bagley, Neutrality 2.0: The Broadband Transition to Transparency, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
& ENT. L.J. 639 (2015); Rob Frieden, Internet Protocol Television and the Challenge of “Mission 
Critical” Bits, supra note 17;  
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E. The Internet’s Fifth Generation
The Internet’s most recent evolution combines the widespread
diffusion of broadband infrastructure with growing consumer interest in 
accessing video content anytime, anywhere, via any device, and in any 
content transmission and screen presentation format.
47
  Consumers 
increasingly consider OTT applications as functional equivalents to 
incumbent media.  They have little tolerance for the rationing of access to 
content via sequential “windows” based on a declining payment scale, e.g., 
initial exclusive, “first run” movies, followed by access via pay per view, 
DVD purchase, download, rental, premium cable network, etc. 
In growing numbers, consumers consider reducing or eliminating 
incumbent media subscriptions because new OTT options offer greater 
value, lower prices, more flexibility, and accessibility from more than one 
device.
48
  Cord cutting refers to the decision by incumbent media 
consumers to abandon their monthly subscriptions.  The term cord shaving 
refers to the decision by subscribers to reduce the number and price of 
content options by migrating to a lower-priced tier, or smaller bundle of 
channels.  Young and price sensitive consumers have begun to consider 
Internet-delivered video options as a partial or complete alternative to 
traditional broadcast, satellite, and wireline content delivery.  Such 
widespread interest in new content delivery options evidences 
dissatisfaction with traditional media display models that tie content to a 
particular time, channel, and sequence of access, a process commonly 
referred to as “appointment television.”
49
 
Consumers have little affinity to any specific distribution technology, 
and expect to have “on demand” access to content via television sets, 
Rob Frieden, The Costs and Benefits of Regulatory Intervention in Internet Disputes: Lessons 
from Broadcast Signal Retransmission Consent Negotiations, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 
1, 1 (2015); Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a 
Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2015); Tejas N. Narechania & 
Tim Wu, Sender Side Transmission Rules for the Internet, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 467 (2014); Adam 
Candeub & Daniel McCartney, Law and the Open Internet, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 493 (2012). 
47. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Internet Protocol Television and the Challenge of “Mission
Critical” Bits, supra note 17; Maggie Macdonald, Comcast v. Netflix: Why the FCC Should 
Redefine Multi-Channel Video Programming Distributors to Include Over-the-Top Video 
Providers, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 479 (2014); Christopher S. Yoo, Possible Paradigm Shifts in 
Broadband Policy, 9 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 367 (2014). 
48. Georg Szalai, U.S. Pay TV Sector Has Biggest-Ever Quarterly Video Sub Decline
(Study), THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/ 
news/us-pay-tv-sector-has-815100; Emily Steel, Nielsen Charts Reach of Video Streaming, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/business/nielsen-reports-2-in-5-us-
households-subscribe-to-video-streaming-services.html.  
49. “A secular trend toward narrowcasting has intensified on the web, as more individuals
forsake appointment television for the ‘long tail’ of online content.”  Pasquale, supra note 43, at 
110.
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computer monitors, smartphone screens, tablets, and even watches.  
Additionally, they are pleased when content providers, such as Netflix, opt 
to make an entire season’s worth of episodes available for “binge 
watching” in lieu of the traditional model that distributes episodes one at a 
time in a weekly, linear sequence. 
Content providers have begun to experiment with alternative 
distribution options
50
 that eliminate intermediaries such as local broadcast 
stations, DBS operators, and cable television providers.  One alternative 
involves the use of new, Internet-based intermediaries such as Hulu, 
Amazon, and YouTube.  Another option eliminates the intermediary so that 
content providers directly serve end users.  Netflix, HBO, and professional 
sport leagues, such as Major League Baseball, provide examples of this 
model. 
Content providers move cautiously and incrementally because they 
have concerns about the potential for piracy and do not want to replace an 
existing intermediary model with a less profitable direct access option.  It 
appears increasingly likely that content producers will have to offer direct 
access models in light of growing consumer dissatisfaction with the status 
quo, particularly the lack of options for an à la carte access to a specific 
network or program instead of the conventional packaging of programming 
tiers or bundles containing many different content sources, many of which 
consumers have no interest in watching. 
Old media ventures have resisted consumer demand for alternatives 
based on real concerns that they may lose audiences, revenues, and sole 
source intermediary status.  Some ventures, particularly cable television 
operators, have offered to expand content access in terms of time and 
device, provided consumers retain their subscription with the 
intermediary.
51
  So-called television everywhere options provides a 
solution to consumers’ antipathy toward appointment television, but it 
maintains the intermediary model and the packaging of content in 
expensive tiers containing dozens of channels. 
In the near term, content intermediaries will confront growing 
subscriber resistance to the tiered content access and à la carte, or smaller 
tiered service will become available.  Recently Dish Network, a DBS 
operator, packaged a “skinny bundle” of fewer channels for access via the 
50. See, e.g., Emily Steel, Suddenly, Plenty of Options for Cord Cutters, N.Y. TIMES (July 
15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/media/streaming-tv-cord-cutting-
guide.html. 
51. See, e.g., Emily Steel, Comcast Offers Its Alternative to Cable TV, Using the Web, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/business/media/comcast-offers-its-
alternative-to-cable-tv-using-the-web.html. 
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Internet.
52
 Verizon, a major diversified telecommunications and Internet 
company, has also offered its video programming subscribers the option of 




III. Increasing Disputes over Interconnection and
Compensation Terms 
The Internet increasingly becomes a functional equivalent to old media 
service options, with emphasis on providing more convenient, diversified, 
and mobile access to video content.
54
  In light of the bandwidth intensive 
nature of video content delivery, last mile ISPs have demanded additional 
compensation from upstream content providers and distributors, as well as 
downstream end users. 
Last mile ISPs operate in what economists call a double-sided market
55
 
because, on one side, upstream content providers and distributors need 
them to deliver content to end users and, on the other side, downstream 
retail broadband subscribers need them for access to and from the Internet 
cloud.  Put another way, retail ISPs provide an essential and not easily 
52. See SLING, https://www.sling.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
53. See VERIZON, FiOS, http://fios.verizon.com/tv-channels.html; Lucas Shaw & Scott
Moritz, Verizon Ushers in the Era of ‘Skinny Cable,’ BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 30, 
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-01/verizon-ushers-in-the-era-of-skinny-
cable-. 
54. See Lindsay Fritchmand, There’s a TV App for That: Putting the “Neutral” Back in Net
Neutrality for the App-Based Television Future, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 299 (2015), 
https://www.pennlawreview.com/notes/index.php?id=13; Rob Frieden, The Impact of Next 
Generation Television on Consumers and the First Amendment, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L. J., 1, 61-95 (2014).  
55. “Platform businesses compete in “multi-sided markets.”  For example, video game
console companies such as Sony, Nintendo, and Microsoft compete for game developers and 
users, while payment card companies such as American Express, MasterCard, and Visa compete 
for merchants and cardholders.  Platform businesses must deal with interdependent demand when 
devising pricing, production, and investment strategies.  These strategies can be quite different 
from non-platform businesses that do not serve mutually dependent customer groups.  The 
optimal price on a particular side of the market, whether measured socially or privately, does not 
follow marginal cost on that side of the market.  Many platform businesses charge one side little 
or nothing; for example, most operating system vendors collect scant revenue from software 
developers who use their intellectual property.  In many cases, the joint provision of a good that 
services multiple groups of customers makes the assignment of costs to any one side arbitrary 
false.” David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON 
REG. 325, 328 (2003); see also Inge Graef, Sih Yuliana Wahyuningtyas & Peggy Valcke, 
Assessing Data Access Issues in Online Platforms, 39 TELECOMM. POL’Y, 375 (2015),  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596114001906; David S. Evans, 
Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-Sided Platforms, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201 
(2012); Daniel M. Tracer, Overcharge but Don’t Overestimate: Calculating Damages for 
Antitrust Injuries in Two-Sided Markets, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (2011).  
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replaced platform or interface for access to high value, “must see” video 
content. 
ISPs control facilities through which a variety of content and 
applications must traverse.  ISPs can have flexibility in determining how 
best to recoup investment costs, possibly erecting subsidies that enhance 
consumer welfare by facilitating access to free or low cost services.
56
  On 
the other hand, such flexibility can provide ISPs with the ability to price 
access in ways that favor ISPs ventures and affiliates.  Because Internet 
service involves multiple ventures providing different services in the link 
from content source to end user, an NRA or court might have great 
difficulty in determining whether an ISP that had used techniques that tilt 
the competitive playing field in favor of an affiliate, or a venture agreeing 
to pay a surcharge for preferred treatment.
57
 
A. The FCC’s Latest Attempt to Prevent Harmful OTT Content
Discrimination
The FCC initially classified OTT carriage of non-voice content as an
information service largely free of regulation.
58
  In a very controversial 
56. For example, a last mile ISP can opt not to debit subscribers’ monthly downloading
allotments as an inducement for subscribing to a new service or because an advertiser has agreed 
to defray the cost.  The FCC has expressed concerns about such zero rating and sponsored data 
plans: Sponsored data plans (sometimes called zero-rating) enable broadband providers to 
exclude edge provider content from end users’ usage allowances.  On the one hand, evidence in 
the record suggests that these business models may in some instances provide benefits to 
consumers, with particular reference to their use in the provision of mobile services.  Service 
providers contend that these business models increase choice and lower costs for consumers.  . . . 
On the other hand, some commenters strongly oppose sponsored data plans, arguing that ‘the 
power to exempt selective services from data caps seriously distorts competition, favors 
companies with the deepest pockets, and prevents consumers from exercising control over what 
they are able to access on the Internet,’ again with specific reference to mobile services.  In 
addition, some commenters argue that sponsored data plans are a harmful form of discrimination. 
The record also reflects concerns that such arrangements may hamper innovation and monetize 
artificial scarcity.” 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 15, ¶ 151 (citations omitted). 
57. “It is far from clear that two-sided markets apply to broadband provision.  The
assumptions one must make are simply too heroic and too distanced from what is known about 
market realities.  Second, even if one accepts these models’ applicability, they are largely 
ambiguous even in theory.  The various models in the literature come to opposite answers.  As 
even the experts for AT&T concede in the Internet proceeding, the models simply do not give 
answers that are robust to the likely market conditions.”  Adam Candeuba1 & Daniel McCartney, 
Law and the Open Internet, FED. COMM. L.J. 493, 513 (2012). 
58. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities
Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, GN Docket No. 00-185, Appropriate Regulatory 
Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, CS Docket No. 02-52, 17 
F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) (cable modem broadband), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–78 (2005); Appropriate Framework for Broadband 
Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,863-64 (2005) (Digital Subscriber Line broadband)
[hereinafter DSL Reclassification Order]; United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory 
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decision, the Commission reclassified broadband Internet access as a 
telecommunications service subject to a streamlined common carrier 
regulatory regime.
59
  For ventures that produce or acquire content, while 
also operating the network used to deliver it to consumers, a confusing 
blend of regulatory safeguards apply to promote neutral carriage and an 
open Internet for competing content.  The FCC emphasizes common carrier 
regulation on ISPs providing the first and last broadband link to the Internet 
cloud.  However, the Commission extends this classification to ISPs 
serving as intermediaries between content providers and downstream ISPs 
providing first and last mile service. 
Unlike some other NRAs, the FCC assumes that network operators, 
providing carriage of content, will operate biased, non-neutral networks 
with the ability to affect the quality of service and other key factors relating 
to how the content arrives: 
[B]roadband providers have both the incentive and the ability to act as
gatekeepers standing between edge providers and consumers.  As 
gatekeepers, they can block access altogether; they can target 
competitors, including competitors to their own video services; and they 
can extract unfair tolls.
60
The FCC has decided to mandate network neutrality largely based on 
the assumption that network operators will get “involved” in the 
distribution of content and not operate as neutral conduits.
61
  The 
Commission has concluded that, absent significant government oversight, 
ISPs will operate biased networks that harm competitors and consumers.
62
 
Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an 
Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13,281 (2006) (broadband 
via power lines); Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901 (2007) (wireless broadband).   
59. The FCC currently requires that telecommunications service providers comply with the
requirements established in Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–276 (2014).  These regulations impose common carriage duties including the obligation
to provide service on a nondiscriminatory basis.  Id.
60. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 15, ¶ 20.
61. “Although broadband providers in many cases provide broadband Internet access
service along with information services, such as email and online storage, we find that broadband 
Internet access service is today sufficiently independent of these information services that it is a 
separate ‘offering.’”  Id. ¶ 356. 
62. “Broadband providers function as gatekeepers for both their end user customers who
access the Internet, and for various transit providers, CDNs, and edge providers attempting to 
reach the broadband provider’s end-user subscribers.  As discussed in more detail below, 
broadband providers (including mobile broadband providers) have the economic incentives and 
technical ability to engage in practices that pose a threat to Internet openness by harming other 
network providers, edge providers, and end users.” Id. ¶ 78. 
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In contrast to a previous, largely unconditional commitment not to 
regulate Internet content, the FCC imposes common carrier regulation on 
ISPs.  The FCC believes that, absent government oversight, an ISP would 
act on its incentive and ability to favor corporate affiliates and ventures 
agreeing to pay for traffic prioritization.
63
  The FCC worries that, absent 
common carrier regulation, ISPs would bifurcate the Internet into fast 
lanes, providing “better than best efforts” traffic carriage at a premium 
price and slow lanes providing “best efforts” service prone to congestion 
and quality of service degradation. 
The FCC emphasizes the need for regulation of ISPs that deliver 
content to end-users.  Broadband subscribers typically retain the services of 
only one last mile ISP for access to and from the Internet cloud.  
Additionally, few consumers in the United States have access to a robustly 
competitive market for broadband service, making it more likely that any 
last mile ISP can operate in a discriminatory manner without loss of 
customers and revenues. 
The FCC has constructed a regulatory regime designed to ensure open 
access to the Internet by requiring ISPs to operate as neutral conduits.  This 
network neutrality, or open Internet policy, requires ISPs to refrain from 
using techniques that would block lawful traffic, deliberately slow 
(“throttle”) traffic streams, even in the absence of network congestion, and 
offer paid prioritization of traffic.  Network neutrality regulation seeks to 
prevent ISPs from creating artificial congestion as justification for network 
management that interferes with traffic streams to achieve anticompetitive 
goals. 
The FCC emphasized the need for narrowly crafted rules designed to 
“prevent specific practices we know are harmful to Internet openness—
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization—as well as a strong standard of 
conduct designed to prevent the deployment of new [anticompetitive] 
practices that would harm Internet openness.”
64
  The Commission 
emphasized that ISPs have both the incentive and ability to leverage access 
in ways that can thwart the virtuous cycle of innovation and investment in 
the Internet ecosystem. 
The FCC emphasized that, while subjecting ISPs to Title II, common 
carrier oversight, the Commission will use its statutory authority quite 
narrowly as evidenced by the decision to forbear
65
 from applying “27 
63. “[B]roadband providers not only have the incentive and ability to limit openness, but
they had done so in the past.”  Id. ¶ 79. 
64. Id. ¶ 4.
65. 47 U.S.C § 160(a) (2015) authorizes the FCC to streamline the scope of its Title II 
oversight by forbearing from applying many common carrier requirements: “[T]he Commission 
shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of this chapter to a 
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provisions of Title II of the Communications Act, and over 700 
Commission rules and regulations.”
66
  The Commission recognized the 
need to explain how the new requirements satisfy pressing needs, but in the 
most narrow and well-calibrated manner, in light of virulent opposition 
from most ISPs and the two Republican Commissioners.  The Order reports 
that “there will be fewer sections of Title II applied than have been applied 
to Commercial Mobile Radio Service (“CMRS”), [the regulatory 
classification for wireless voice telecommunications service] where 
Congress expressly required the application of Sections 201, 202, and 208, 
and permitted the Commission to forbear from others.  In fact, Title II has 
never been applied in such a focused way.”
67
 
In addition to the specific prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization, the FCC established a general prohibition on ISP practices 
that would unreasonably interfere with or disadvantage downstream 
consumers and upstream edge providers of content, applications, and 
services.  The Commission will consider on a case-by-case basis whether 
an ISP has engaged in a practice “that unreasonably interfere[s] with or 
unreasonably disadvantage[s] the ability of consumers to reach the Internet 
content, services, and applications of their choosing or of edge providers to 
access consumers using the Internet.”
68
  The Commission opted to apply a 
more open-ended and evaluative legal standard, prohibiting commercially 
unreasonable practices it had proposed in the 2014 Open Internet NPRM.  
The Commission concluded that it should “adopt a governing standard that 
looks to whether consumers or edge providers face unreasonable 
interference or unreasonable disadvantages, and makes clear that the 
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications 
carriers or telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their geographic markets, if the 
Commission determines that (1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to 
ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that 
telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not 
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not 
necessary for the protection of consumers; and  (3) forbearance from applying such provision or 
regulation is consistent with the public interest.”  47 U.S.C. § 160(a). 
66. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 15, ¶ 5.  The major provisions of Title II that the
Order will apply are: nondiscrimination and no unjust and unreasonable practices under sections 
201 and 202; authority to investigate complaints and resolve disputes under section 208 and 
related enforcement provisions, specifically sections 206, 207, 209, 216 and 217; protection of 
consumer privacy under section 222; fair access to poles and conduits under Section 224, 
protection of people with disabilities under sections 225 and 255; and providing universal funding 
for broadband service, but not the requirement to collect contributions to such funding through 
partial application of section 254.  Id. 
67. Id. ¶ 38.
68. Id. ¶ 135.
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The FCC reported that it will use the “no-unreasonable interference/
disadvantage” standard to evaluate controversial subjects including the 
lawfulness of “sponsored data” arrangements where an ISP accepts 
advertiser payment in exchange for an agreement not to meter and debit the 
downstream traffic delivery.  The Commission will also use this standard to 
consider the lawfulness of data caps that tier service by the amount of 
permissible downloading volume.  In both instances, the FCC sees the 
potential for an ISP to create artificial scarcity to extract higher revenues, to 
favor corporate affiliates and third parties willing to pay a surcharge, as 
well as the potential for disadvantaging competitors, e.g., using data caps to 
harm new vendors of video programming that compete with an ISP service. 
The Order expresses the view that reclassifying Internet access as a 
telecommunications service provides the strongest legal foundation for the 
Open Internet regulations, coupled with a secondary reference to section 
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Title III, which addresses 
the use of radio spectrum and applies common carriage regulation to 
wireless voice carriers.
70
  By using the stronger Title II foundation, the 
FCC asserts that it can not only establish clear and unconditional statutory 
authority, but also use the flexibility contained in Title II to forbear from 
applying most common carrier requirements not relevant to modern 
broadband service just as occurs for wireless telephone service.  However, 
with a Title II regulatory foundation, the Order makes it possible for the 
FCC to create an open Internet conduct standard that ISPs cannot harm 




69. Id. ¶ 150.  The FCC identified a number of factors it will consider in future evaluations.
These include an assessment whether a practice allows end-user control and is consistent with 
promoting consumer choice, its competitive effect, whether consumers and opportunities for free 
expression are promoted or harmed, the effect on innovation, investment, or broadband 
deployment, whether the practice hiders the ability of end users or edge providers to use 
broadband access to communicate with each other and whether a practice conforms to best 
practices and technical standards adopted by open, broadly representative, and independent 
Internet engineering, governance initiatives, or standards-setting organization.  Id. at ¶¶ 139-145. 
70. “We ground the open Internet rules we adopt today in multiple sources of legal
authority—section 706, Title II, and Title III of the Communications Act.  We marshal all of 
these sources of authority toward a common statutorily-supported goal:  to protect and promote 
Internet openness as platform for competition, free expression and innovation; a driver of 
economic growth; and an engine of the virtuous cycle of broadband deployment.  We therefore 
invoke multiple, complementary sources of legal authority.  As a number of parties point out, our 
authority under section 706 is not mutually exclusive with our authority under Titles II and III of 
the Act.” Id. at ¶¶ 273-74.  
71. With an eye toward providing timely, certain and flexible enforcement of its open
Internet rules, the FCC announced its intention to use advisory opinions similar to those issued by 
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The Commission’s decision to treat aspects of Internet access as 
common carriage will certainly trigger a third judicial appeal and review 
whether such reclassification constitutes a reasonable decision based on a 
complete evidentiary record.  By opting for the reclassification option, the 
FCC underscores the riskiness in imposing ex ante regulation without an 
explicit legislative mandate. 
B. Declining Confidence in Commercially Negotiated Peering Arrangements
The FCC has expressed uncertainty whether recent contentious peering
arrangements end up with a fair outcome evidencing good faith, 
commercially driven negotiations.  The 2015 Open Internet Order 
acknowledges that stakeholders have generated “competing narratives,” 
particularly when disputes have arisen.
72
  Advocates for dispute resolution, 
and perhaps more aggressive government oversight, identify a scenario 
where an ISP exercises bottleneck control over an essential transmission 
link for which a content provider or distributor has no readily available 
alternative route: 
  Some edge and transit providers assert that large broadband Internet 
access service providers are creating artificial congestion by refusing to 
upgrade interconnection capacity at their network entrance points for 
settlement-free peers or CDNs, thus forcing edge providers and CDNs to 
agree to paid peering arrangements.  These parties suggest that paid 
arrangements resulting from artificially congested interconnection ports 
at the broadband Internet access service provider network edge could 
create the same consumer harms as paid arrangements in the last-mile, 
and lead to paid prioritization, fast lanes, degradation of consumer 
connections, and ultimately, stifling of innovation by edge providers.
73
The alternative scenario characterizes commercial negotiations 
resulting in more costly terms and conditions as a fair outcome in light of 
the substantial investment made to accommodate upstream demand for last 
mile delivery of ever growing volume of video content: 
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division: “Advisory opinions will enable companies to seek 
guidance on the propriety of certain open Internet practices before implementing them, enabling 
them to be proactive about compliance and avoid enforcement actions later.  The Commission 
may use advisory opinions to explain how it will evaluate certain types of behavior and the 
factors that will be considered in determining whether open Internet violations have occurred.  
Because these opinions will be publicly available, we believe that they will reduce the number of 
disputes by providing guidance to the industry.”  Id. ¶ 229. 
72. Id. ¶ 200.
73. Id.
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  In contrast, large broadband Internet access service providers assert 
that edge providers such as Netflix are imposing a cost on broadband 
Internet access service providers who must constantly upgrade 
infrastructure to keep up with the demand.  Large broadband Internet 
access service providers explain that when an edge provider sends 
extremely large volumes of traffic to a broadband Internet access service 
provider—e.g., through a CDN or a third-party transit service provider—
the broadband provider must invest in additional interconnection 
capacity (e.g., new routers or ports on existing routers) and middle-mile 
transport capacity in order to accommodate that traffic, exclusive of 
“last-mile” costs from the broadband Internet access provider’s central 
offices, head ends, or cell sites to end-user locations. Commenters assert 
that if the broadband Internet access service provider absorbs these 
interconnection and transport costs, all of the broadband provider’s 
subscribers will see their bills rise.
74
The FCC evidenced an unwillingness to pick sides, but ultimately 
opted not to subject interconnection and compensation negotiations to 
regulatory oversight.
75
  The Commission chose a case-by-case approach, 
emphasizing investigation of complaints,
76
 in light of the fact that this 
process “historically has functioned without significant Commission 
oversight.”
77
  Perhaps mindful of several recent and pending merger 
applications, requiring FCC and Department of Justice approval, the FCC 
also noted that it will consider the competitive impact of such acquisitions 
on the peering process.
78
 
The FCC’s review of AT&T’s proposed acquisition of DirecTV
79
 
provided the Commission with an opportunity to impose more safeguards 
74. Id. ¶ 201.
75. “We conclude that it would be premature to adopt prescriptive rules to address any 
problems that have arisen or may arise.  It is also premature to draw policy conclusions 
concerning new paid Internet traffic exchange arrangements between broadband Internet access 
service providers and edge providers, CDNs, or backbone services.”  Id. ¶ 202 (citation omitted). 
76. “The Commission will be available to hear disputes raised under sections 201 and 202
on a case-by-case basis.  We believe this is an appropriate vehicle for enforcement where disputes 
are primarily between sophisticated entities over commercial terms and that include companies, 
like transit providers and CDNs, that act on behalf of smaller edge providers.”  Id. ¶ 205. 
77. Id. ¶ 203.
78. “The Commission’s regulatory and enforcement oversight, including over common
carriers, is complementary to vigorous antitrust enforcement.  Indeed, mobile voice services have 
long been subject to Title II’s just and reasonable standard and both the Commission and the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have repeatedly reviewed mergers in the wireless 
industry.  Thus, it will remain essential for the Commission, as well as the Department of Justice, 
to continue to carefully monitor, review, and where appropriate, take action against any anti-
competitive mergers, acquisitions, agreements or conduct, including where broadband Internet 
access services are concerned.”  Id.  
79. Applications of AT&T Inc. and DIRECTV for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of
Licenses and Authorizations, MB Docket No. 14-90, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 15-
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and oversight of the peering process.  Online video distributors (“OVDs”) 
had expressed concerns that AT&T, in its capacity as a major ISP, could 
discriminate against unaffiliated content providers and distributors by 
allowing congestion to build up at the interconnection points with AT&T’s 
last-mile network and by over-charging OVDs for access to the network, 
thereby raising their costs of doing business.
80
 
The FCC did not explicitly agree, but it did increase the scope and 
nature of its AT&T interconnection oversight.
81
  The Commission imposed 
disclosure requirements for interconnection agreements and 
interconnection metrics that it will use to assess whether the terms and 
conditions of Internet traffic exchange agreements have the potential to 
generate congestion, hinder competition, or harm consumers.  Additionally, 
AT&T must retain both an internal company compliance officer and an 
independent, external compliance officer who will report and monitor, 
respectively, the combined entity’s compliance with the conditions 
imposed by the FCC.
82
 
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order evidences significant 
ambivalence at the FCC in terms of what, if any, regulatory oversight is 
needed to ensure timely, fair, and good faith interconnection negotiations 
among ISPs, and between content distributors and ISPs.
83
  The Commission 
acknowledges the benefits of a hands off approach that favors commercial 
negotiations.  However, it also recognizes the potential for harm to both 
consumers and competition, particularly when one party perceives a 
negotiation advantage by stalling and refusing to offer good faith terms. 
94 (rel. July 28, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-order-approving-att-directv-
transaction [hereinafter AT&T-DirecTV Acquisition]. 
80. See id. ¶ 214.
81. “[G]iven our heightened concern where ISPs compete with third-party Internet-based 
services (i.e., OVDs), we impose additional conditions that require the combined entity to file all 
interconnection agreements with the Commission and to provide the Commission with certain 
interconnection performance metrics, which we will use in combination to monitor the terms and 
effects of such interconnection arrangements.”  Id. ¶ 219. 
82. Id. ¶ 397.
83. At the same time as the FCC considers whether and how to intervene in ISP
interconnection and compensation disputes, it also reassesses whether it should become more 
proactive when local broadcasters cannot reach timely closure to negotiations covering the terms 
and conditions by which multichannel video program distributors, such as cable and satellite 
television operators, secure rights to retransmit the signals.  See Amendment of the Commission’s 
Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, MB Docket No. 10-71, Report and Order and Further 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 F.C.C.R. 3351 (2014); see also Rob Frieden, The Costs and 
Benefits of Regulatory Intervention in Internet Disputes: Lessons from Broadcast Signal 
Retransmission Consent Negotiations, supra, note 46, at 1. 
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When presented with the opportunity to impose and extract concessions in 
exchange for approval of a controversial merger, the FCC opted for more 
extensive reporting requirements and other safeguards.
84
 
The FCC had wisely opted not to impose a comprehensive, ex ante 
regulatory regime over interconnection and compensation agreements 
executed between retail ISPs and upstream ventures.  The FCC articulated 
a wait and see approach rather than anticipate the need to intervene in 
disputes.  The Commission properly defers to commercial incentives that 
support connectivity that would provide consumers with congestion-free 
access to OTT content. 
However, the FCC and other NRAs may not avoid having to intervene 
when parties cannot reach timely settlement of disputes.  Regulatory 
agencies should use a complaint resolution process to resolve disputes with 
emphasis on expediting a solution rather than applying service definitions 
that trigger different regulatory status and burdens.  NRAs should permit 
ventures to negotiate compensation arrangements that enhance quality of 
service and provide better than best efforts switching and routing of must 
see video content.  Consumers expect to receive such content on a seamless 
and congestion free basis.  Indeed, they pay significant subscription fees 
based on the assumption that Netflix and other video content will arrive 
without degradation or delay. 
While NRAs should permit ISPs to negotiate and secure surcharges for 
traffic prioritization, advocates for such arrangements should bear the 
burden of proving that they will not intentionally degrade service to 
ventures opting not to pay a premium. ISPs should not have the opportunity 
to create artificial congestion as a way to nudge or shove consumers and 
content providers to premium services.  Additionally, ISPs should bear the 
burden of proving that they will offer premium service arrangements to any 
venture regardless of affiliation. 
NRAs should use dispute resolution procedures to ensure that ISPs 
operate in a transparent manner when offering alternatives to conventional 
best efforts routing.  They should ensure that ISPs continue to offer basic 
services that should suffice for most ventures.  ISPs should not have the 
ability to bifurcate their networks into fast and slow lanes where 
conventional services are all but certain to offer unacceptably slow and 
inferior service.  On the other hand, they should have the opportunity to 
engage in commercially desirable price and quality of service 
discrimination that does not harm competition and consumers. 
84. “We also impose certain disclosure requirements for interconnection agreements and
interconnection metrics, which will help the Commission address any future concerns about the 
nature of AT&T’s exchange of Internet traffic and the potential impact of congestion upon 
consumers.” 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 15, at 7. 
